1 2 3 4	COREY W. GLAVE (State Bar No. 16474 Attorney at Law 1042 2 nd Street Hermosa Beach, CA 90254 Phone: (323) 547-0472 Fax: (310) 379-0456 POAattorney@aol.com	ELECTRONICALLY FILED Superior Court of California, County of Orange 08/04/2015 at 08:50:00 AM Clerk of the Superior Court By Fidel Ibarra, Deputy Clerk		
5 6 7	Attorneys for Plaintiffs Santa Ana Police Officers Assoc. and Officers No. 1 and Officer No. 2			
8	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA			
9	FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE-CENTRAL			
10				
11 12	SANTA ANA POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION and DOE OFFICER 1 AND DOE OFFICER 2	Case 30-2015-00801604-CU-OE-CJC Assigned to Hon. Ronald L. Bauer		
13	Plaintiffs,	EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR		
14	VS.	TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE;		
15 16 17	CITY OF SANTA ANA, a Municipal Corporation; SANTA ANA POLICE DEPARTMENT, a public safety department; CARLOS ROJAS, Chief of Police; DOES I-X, inclusive	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES, DECLARATION OF COREY W. GLAVE, IN SUPPORT. Hearing: August 5, 2015 Time: 卷:30 â:㎡.		
18	Defendants.	Dept.: C20		
19				
20	Plaintiffs SANTA ANA POLICE OF	FICERS ASSOCIATION and DOE OFFICER		
21	1 AND DOE OFFICER 2 are forced to apply, <i>ex parte</i> , for a Temporary Restraining			
22	Order, to prevent suffering irreparable harm to Doe Officer 1, Doe Officer 2 and			
23	similarly situated officers of the Santa Ana Police Department if the Department			
24	continues to use, for administrative purposes, an illegally recorded video of Plaintiff			
25	Officers. Plaintiffs' statutory rights will be violated and their livelihood threatened unless			
26	this Court prevents the City of Santa Ana from using the unlawfully obtained evidence			
27	to investigate and/or implement punitive action against the officers involved in the			
28	service of a search warrant that was illegally recorded.			

The Recording Party¹ (subjects and/or attorney of business that was the subject of the search warrant secretly recorded the officers in a clear violation of California's Invasion of Privacy Act, which criminalizes the non-consensual recording of confidential communications. (Penal Code §632(a)). Defendants then used the unlawful recordings to initiate administrative proceedings against the officers. Plaintiffs seek a Temporary Restraining Order restraining Defendant CITY OF SANTA ANA, a Municipal Corporation; SANTA ANA POLICE DEPARTMENT, a public safety department; and CARLOS ROJAS, Chief of Police, and its/his/their agents, servants and employees, from:

- (A) Initiating, continuing or subjecting the involved officers, including Doe Officer 1, Doe Officer 2 and Doe Officer 3, and all other similarly situated officers, to any judicial, administrative, legislative or other proceeding, including, but not limited to administrative investigations, based on evidence obtained as a result of an illegal eavesdropping upon or recording of confidential communications, or the fruits of said recording, in violation of Penal Code §632;
- (B) Using and/or maintaining any materials/information/statements, and/or the fruits of said materials/information/statements, unlawfully obtained in violation of Government Code §3303;
- (C) Imposing any punitive action for matters/charges/allegations based on (1) the illegally recording of the officers, (2) the unlawfully conducted interrogation of the officers, and/or (3) the fruits of said unlawfully obtained evidence.

Plaintiffs also apply for an Order to Show Cause why a preliminary injunction

¹The Recording Party already released edited portions of the video in the media causing a firestorm of publicity as the Recording Party, based on intentionally edited portions of videos, falsely accused the officers of ingesting marijuana laced food commonly called edibles. Plaintiffs are trying to obtain the full video so that legal action may also be properly brought against the Recording Party.

should not be granted enjoining said Defendants from committing the above actions during the pendency of this action.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants engaged in clear violations of Penal Code §632 by using evidence obtained from an illegal eavesdropping/recording of communications and that Defendants engaged in a clear violation of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Right Act ("Act"), Government Code Section 3300, et seq., by unlawfully refusing to provide required documents prior to a second or "subsequent" interrogation of the involved officers. Both Penal Code §637.2 and Government Code §3309.5 authorize this court to grant injunctive relief immediately upon learning of the violations.

Where a legislative body has enacted a statutory provision proscribing a certain activity, it has already determined that such activity is contrary to the public interest. Further, where the legislative body has specifically authorized injunctive relief against the violation of such a law, it has already determined (1) that significant public harm will result from the proscribed activity, and (2) that injunctive relief may be the most appropriate way to protect against that harm. (See *Paul v. Wadler* (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 615, 625).

Plaintiff stand to suffer irreparable harm² if the Defendants are allowed to proceed with their investigation and/or proceed with proposing punitive action with the unlawfully obtained evidence in that Defendant will have violated numerous provision of state law and public policy, and Plaintiff will be denied a proper remedy for the violation of their rights. Furthermore, if Defendants are allowed to proceed with the administrative case, Plaintiffs will be subjected to punitive action, up to and including

²In this case, Plaintiffs officers could have their vested right to continued employment terminated and be removed from the payroll with loss of all medical and other benefits. Plaintiffs will then be inhibited from finding other work in their chosen profession. This alone constitutes irreparable harm. (See *Volpicelli v. Jared Sydney Torrance Memorial Hosp.*, (1980)109 Cal.App.3d 242 (The nature of an employees' to practice his chose profession is not merely a personal right; it is a property interest which directly relates to the pursuit of his livelihood. Such interest is clearly a fundamental right. Denying this right may well have the effect of denying him the right to capably practice his profession (citations omitted)).

termination resulting in Plaintiffs being denied their right to continued employment and a continued paycheck; Plaintiff's only source of revenue. Finally, Plaintiff will be forced to defend the disciplinary action which is based on unlawfully obtained statements and/or evidence.

This application is made pursuant to Penal Code §632 and 637.2, together with the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act, Government Code §3309.5(b) which vests the Superior Court with initial jurisdiction over any proceeding brought by any public safety officer against any public safety department for alleged violations under the Bill of Rights Act, Government code § 3300, et seq. Government Code §3309.5(c) further provides that:

"In any case where the superior court finds that a public safety department has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall render appropriate injunctive or other extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of the like or similar nature including, but not limited to the granting of the temporary restraining order, preliminary or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive actions against the public safety officer."

Immediate and irreparable injury, loss and/or damages pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §526 and Government Code §3309.5 will result to Plaintiffs unless this Court immediately enjoins Defendants.

Plaintiffs has not previously applied for any judicial relief as herein requested.

The name and contract information of the attorney for all Defendants is believed to be Laura Rossinni, Sr. Assistant City Attorney, City of Santa Ana, 20 Civic Center Plaza, M29, Santa Ana, CA 92702, (714) 647-5201, lirossini@santa-ana.org. Notice was provided to counsel via telephonic notice and e-mail notice on August 3, 2015 (See Glave Declaration and Exhibit 2)

This application is based on the verified Complaint on file in this case, on the declarations of Corey Glave, Esq., Doe Officer 1, Doe Officer 2, Doe Officers 3 and on

the Memorandum of Points and Authori	ities file	ed herein.
Data di Aviaviat 2, 2045	COD	
Dated: August 3, 2015	COR	EY W. GLAVE, ATTORNEY AT LAW
	Ву	/s/ Corey W. Glave
		Corey W. Glave, Attorney for Plaintiffs
	5	
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a case of a knee jerk response to the public dissemination of illegal video recordings of officers during the service of a search warrant on a marijuana dispensary. Defendants overreacted to rumors and innuendo attached to the publication of the illegal recordings. Not only Defendants initiated an administrative investigation based on evidence unlawfully obtained, but then Defendants, themselves, started violating state law.

Because the Defendants based their administrative investigation on evidence obtained from an unlawful recording, and then violated the involved officers' rights, this Court is mandated by the applicable statutes to render appropriate injunctive or other extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer. (Government Code §3309.5(d)(1)); see also Penal Code §637.2).

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On or about May 26, 2015, members of the Santa Ana Police Department, including Doe Officer 1 and Doe Officer 2³, participated in the service of a narcotic search warrant on a location in the City of Santa Ana, commonly referred to as the "Sky

³Plaintiff Doe Officer 1 is a male, uniformed officer; Plaintiff Doe Officer 2, is a female, uniformed officer employed by the Santa Ana Police Department. The name of the officer is being withheld pursuant to Penal Code §§832.5-832.8, Evidence Code §§1043-1046, and due to several threats received as a result of the underlying incident. (See *Long Beach Police Officers Association v. City of Long Beach* (2014) 59 Cal.4th 59, 75). There is sufficient information contained herein, and in the Complaint, for Defendants to ascertain the identity and name of each officer. Defendants have agreed to the need to keep the officers' identity concealed at this time. (See Exhibit 1)

High Medical Marijuana Dispensary" ("Dispensary"). During the search warrant service, a number of uniformed officer and undercover officers participated in the search. The undercover officers, due to the nature of their continuing investigative work, wore masks to hide their identity from the general public.

After making entry into the Dispensary all civilians present in the Dispensary were escorted out of the business and detained outside. The only people to remain inside the Dispensary were Police Department employees, until Fire Authority personnel arrived to open locked safes. After all civilians were escorted/detained outside, Doe Officer 1, as instructed by his superior officers, disabled all known recording devices (video cameras and DVR). At this time, all police personnel present had a reasonable expectation that their conversations and actions were no longer being recorded. In fact, the undercover officers, feeling that they were safe to do so, removed their masks.

After the known recording devices were disabled, the officers, including Doe Officer 1 and Doe Officer 2, had an objectively reasonable expectation that their communications (words and actions) were not being overheard or recorded and that their actions, conversations and all forms of communications would be confined to the parties thereto. Their communications were not in a public gathering or in any legislative, judicial, executive or administrative proceeding open to the public. They also did not reasonably expect that their communications may be overheard or recorded. Based on this reasonable belief, the officers engaged in joking behavior and other communications between the officers.

Unbeknownst to involved officers, the owners of the business and/or their attorney (collectively "Recording Party"), in anticipation that the Dispensary would be raided, placed additional hidden cameras in the Dispensary to record the communications (actions and words) of law enforcement officers. The Recording Party was not a party to the communications and did not seek nor obtain the consent from any involved officers to have their communications recorded.

The Recording Party then released edited portions of the secret and illegal recording to media outlets in a manner to purposely distort the officers actions and statements and to cause problems for both the involved officers and the City's enforcement actions. After the illegal recordings were released to the media, representative of Defendants viewed the videos and, based solely on the content of the edited illegal recordings, initiated internal affairs investigations of each of the officers involved in the warrant service, including internal investigations of Doe Officer 1 and Doe Officer 2.

Without the illegal recordings, there would have been no reason to initiate an internal investigation of any officer, including Doe Officer 1 or Doe Officer 2, as there would be no basis to, rightfully or wrongfully, allege any misconduct against the officers involved in the service of the search warrant.

On or about June 18, 2015, Doe Officer 2 was interrogated by Defendants. Prior to being interviewed, Doe Officer 2 was shown selective portions of the illegal recordings. Doe Officer 2, via her legal counsel, objected to the investigation based on the fact that the investigation was initiated and based solely on the illegal recordings. Defendants did not deny the basis of the investigation was the illegal recordings, but summarily dismissed the objection and ordered Doe Officer 2 to continue with the interrogation or be subjected to discipline for insubordination.

Similarly, on or about June 21, 2015, Doe Officer 1 was interrogated by Defendants. Prior to being interviewed, Doe Officer 1 was shown selective portions of the illegal recordings. Doe Officer 1, via his legal counsel, objected to the investigation based on the fact that the investigation was initiated and based solely on the illegal recordings. Defendants did not deny that the basis of the investigation was the illegal recordings, but summarily dismissed the objection and ordered Doe Officer 1 to continue with the interrogation or be subjected to discipline for insubordination.

At some unknown point, Defendants obtained additional footage from the illegal recording referenced above. Based on the additional footage, Doe Officer 1, Doe

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Officer 2, and other involved officers were notified of subsequent or second interrogations.

Upon being notified of further proceedings; to wit, further interrogations at a subsequent time, both Doe Officer 1 and Doe Officer 2, via counsel, requested that, pursuant to Government Code §3303(g), Defendants provide, in a reasonable time prior to these subsequent interrogations, all required documents under Government Code §3303. The Officers further reasserted their objections to the investigation in total as it was based on evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful recording of the officers.

The officer's Penal Code §632 objections were ignored, and their requests for materials were denied. The officers were ordered to appear for further investigation without being provided any materials other than the recording of their first interrogation.

Doe Officer 1 was subsequently interrogated for a second time on July 17, 2015, at approximately 1015 hours. Doe Officer 2 was subsequently interrogated for a second time on July 17, 2015, at 1112 hours. Both officers were shown additional illegal recordings and interrogated about the content of the recordings.

Plaintiffs are informed and believe that Defendants, as part of the administrative (internal affairs) investigation into the service of the search warrant, were in possession and control of copies of the other reports and complaints (written by the investigators and/or others), including, but not limited to, copies of the illegal recordings, recorded interviews with other officers, and reports generated throughout the administrative investigation, including summaries of the prior interrogations of Doe Officer 1 and Doe Officer 2.

III. ARGUMENT

As its name suggests, a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is an order that is sought by a plaintiff prior to a full adjudication of the merits of its claim. [Citation.]" (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554) The purpose of such an order "is to preserve the status quo until a final determination following a trial." (Scaringe v.

J.C.C. Enterprises, Inc. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1536, 1542). It "does not constitute a final adjudication of the controversy." (*Ibid.*, see also *Costa Mesa City Employees'*Assn. v. City of Costa Mesa, (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 298)

California Code of Civil Procedure §526 provides that an injunction may be granted when it appears from the complaint or affidavits that the commission of some act during litigation would produce great or irreparable injury to a party to the action. *Public Employment Relations Board v. Modesto City School District* (1982) 136 Cal.3d 881. Importantly, where a legislative body has enacted a statutory provision proscribing a certain activity, it has already determined that such activity is contrary to the public interest. Further, where the legislative body has specifically authorized injunctive relief against the violation of such a law, it has already determined (1) that significant public harm will result from the proscribed activity, and (2) that injunctive relief may be the most appropriate way to protect against that harm. (See *Paul v. Wadler* (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 615, 625).

In deciding whether to issue preliminary injunctive relief, courts must assess two interrelated factors: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial; and (2) the interim harm that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunctive relief were denied as compared to the harm that the defendant is likely to suffer if the order were issued. (*Church of Christ in Hollywood v. Superior Court*, 99 Cal.App.4th 1244, 1251 (2002).

Courts evaluate these two factors on a continuum such that "[t]he more likely it is that plaintiffs will ultimately prevail, the less severe must be the harm that they allege will occur if the injunction does not issue. (*Right Site Coalition v. Los Angeles Unified School District.*, 160 Cal.App.4th 336, 338-339). Furthermore, "if the party seeking the injunction can make a sufficiently strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits, the trial court has discretion to issue the injunction notwithstanding that party's inability to show that the balance of harms tips in his favor." (*Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors*, 49 Cal.3d 432, 441-442 (1989).

The two factor test, which represent two points on sliding scale in which required probability of success decreases as degree of irreparable harm increases, applies for determining propriety of Temporary Restraining Orders and/or preliminary injunctions with the moving party required to demonstrate either: (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of the hardship tips sharply in favor of the moving party. Whether to issue a TRO or preliminary injunction must be guided by a mix of the potential merit and the interim harm factors; the greater the plaintiff's showing on one, the less must be shown on the other to support relief. (Price v. City of Stockton 394 F. Supp.2d 1256 (E.D. Cal. 2005)).

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Defendants Are Basing Administrative Investigation on Evidence Obtained Α. from an Illegal Recording

In 1967, the California Legislature enacted a broad, protective invasion-of-privacy statute in response to what it viewed as a serious and increasing threat to the confidentiality of private communications resulting from then recent advances in science and technology that had led to the development of new devices and techniques for eavesdropping upon and recording such private communications. (Pen.Code, §§ 630- 637.2.) One of the provisions of the legislation, section 637.2, explicitly created a statutory private right of action, authorizing any person who has been injured by any violation of the invasion-of-privacy legislation to bring a civil action to recover damages and to obtain injunctive relief in response to such violation. (Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., (2006) 39 Cal.4th 95, 115-116.

The Act is designed to effectuate California's strong public policy interest in protecting the privacy of its citizens. (Flanagan v. Flanagan, 27 Cal.4th 766, 775 (2002). To that end, "courts are required to liberally construe section 632 to effectuate [this] policy." Kight v. CashCall, Inc., 231 Cal.App.4th112, 130 (2014)

 California Penal Code § 632 makes it illegal for any person⁴ to intentionally and without the consent of all parties to a confidential communication, by means of any electronic amplifying or recording device, eavesdrops upon or records⁵ the confidential communication. The term "confidential communication" is to be construed broadly and a conversation is a "confidential communication," if a party to the conversation has an objectively reasonable expectation that the conversation is not being overheard or recorded. *Flanagan v. Flanagan* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 766; *Frio v. Superior Court* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1480.)⁶

Plaintiffs will prevail in establishing that the recording of their conversations was illegal. First, all civilian personnel were removed and detained outside; the only people that remained were public safety officials. Next, all know security cameras were disabled and the DVR was confiscated. The officers then began to act and speak freely while going about their duties. In fact, undercover officers felt safe enough to remove their masks— which the illegal recordings then videotaped their faces. The illegal recordings were recorded through a second set of hidden cameras that the officers were not aware of. Finally, none of the officers believed that they were being overheard or recorded, they did not consent to being recorded and they would not have

⁴The term "person" includes an individual, business association, partnership, corporation, limited liability company, or other legal entity, and an individual acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of any government or subdivision thereof, whether federal, state, or local, but excludes an individual known by all parties to a confidential communication to be overhearing or recording the communication. (Penal Code §632(b))

⁵Recording includes any audio or video recording of "communication" (which is not limited to conversations or oral communications but rather encompasses any communication, regardless of its form, where any party to the communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto.) *People v. Gibbons*, (Cal.App. 4 Dist. 1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1204, 1208.

⁶The high court stated that under the *Frio* test, "confidentiality" requires " 'nothing more than the existence of a reasonable expectation by one of the parties that no one is "listening in" or overhearing the conversation.' " (*Flanagan, supra*, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 772-773)

 acted or spoken in the same manner if they had know that they were being recorded.

Next, the Penal Code provides that "[E]xcept as proof in an action or prosecution for violation of this section, no evidence obtained as a result of eavesdropping upon or recording a confidential communication in violation of this section shall be admissible in any judicial, administrative, legislative, or other proceeding. (Penal Code §632(d)). Cases interpreting this section have ruled that requires the court or administrative body to excise and disregard the information unlawfully obtained and any other information obtained as the tainted 'fruit' thereof. *People v. Buchanan*, (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 274, 289. Furthermore, §632 prohibits unconsented-to recording or monitoring regardless of the content of the conversation or the purpose of the monitoring. *Kight v. CashCall, Inc.*, (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1389.

Furthermore, California Penal Code §637.2 provides, in pertinent part, that "[A]ny person who has been injured by a violation of this chapter may, in accordance with Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 525) of Title 7 of Part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, bring an action to enjoin and restrain any violation of this chapter, and may in the same action seek damages. (Penal Code §637.2(b)). Finally, it is not a necessary prerequisite to an action pursuant to this section that the plaintiff has suffered, or be threatened with, actual damages. (Penal Code §637.2(c)).

Plaintiffs, and each of them, bring this action on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated officers, seeking injunctive relief against Defendants, and each of them, who have violated these Penal Code sections by knowingly using evidence obtained as a result of an illegal eavesdropping/recording against the officers involved in the service of the search warrant, including Doe Officer 1 and Doe Officer 2.

Plaintiffs have no plain, speedy or adequate remedy under the law. They have attempted to persuade Defendants to terminate their administrative investigation voluntarily and have repeatedly objected to the use of the illegal recordings and/or the fruits of the illegal recording to no avail. Furthermore, pursuant to Penal Code §637.2, Plaintiffs need not pursue any administrative remedy in order to address this problem

nor must they wait to suffer actual damages. Thus, Plaintiffs are excused from or have exhausted his/her/its administrative remedies.

B. Violation of Government Code §3300, et seq.

In 1976 the California State Legislature passed Government Code Section 3300, et. seq., also known as "The Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act. This legislation was created in order to provide public safety officers throughout the State of California with the rights and protections the Legislature found necessary to stop the abusive practices of public safety agencies when conducting internal investigations. These protections consist of restrictions on the manner in which investigation and interviews can be conducted and set out certain rights and procedures. *Pasadena Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Pasadena*, (1990) 51 Cal.3d 564. The Act specifies the "basic rights and protections which must be afforded all public safety officers (see § 3301) by the public entities which employ them and was a catalogue of the minimum rights to protect employees from abuse or arbitrary treatment. (Ibid; *Baggett v. Gates*, (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128; *White v. County of Sacramento* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676).

In interpreting the public safety officer's rights under the Act, a general rule of statutory construction requires a liberal construction in favor of those persons for whom a statute was designed to protect. *Connolly Development, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1976) 17 Cal.3d 803, 826-827. Consequently, in the matter at hand, the construction of Government Code §3300, and its subparts should be liberally constructed to protect the employee's rights as the Act is remedial, and case law call for a liberal construction of the rights guaranteed by the Act. *Baggett* (supra); *White* (supra); *Lybarger v. Los Angeles*, (1985) 40 Cal.3d 822.

In the matter at hand, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants violated provisions of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act ("Act"). Government Code §3309.5 provides that it shall be unlawful for any public safety department to deny or refuse to any public safety officer the rights and protections guaranteed to them by this

chapter (3309.5(a)). It further provides that in any case where the superior court finds that a public safety department has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, the court **shall render appropriate injunctive** or other extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary, or permanent injunction prohibiting the department proceeding in violation of the act (see §3309.5(c)).

The Legislature enacted section 3309.5 of the Act "to allow an officer to pursue a remedy immediately in the courts for violation of these rights during the investigation and not be required to wait for judicial review after administrative consideration of those violations." *Mounger v. Gates* (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1248, 1256 (after examining the Legislative History of the Act, determined there was nothing in section 3309.5 which requires an officer to exhaust his or her administrative remedies); see also: *Gales v. Superior Court* (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1602; *Aguilar v. Johnson*, (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 241.

Plaintiffs acknowledge that officers are not entitled to discovery or documents prior to their first interrogation, and Plaintiffs are not seeking "pre-interrogation" discovery in this case. However, the Act, as interpreted by the California Supreme Court, requires that prior to a second interrogation or "any further interrogation at a subsequent time" that the public safety officer shall be entitled to a transcribed copy of any notes made by a stenographer or to any reports or complaints made by investigators or other persons.

Specifically, Government Code §3303(g) provides: "The complete interrogation of a public safety officer may be recorded. If a tape recording is made of the interrogation, the public safety officer shall have access to the tape if any further proceedings are contemplated or prior to any further interrogation at a subsequent time. The public safety officer shall be entitled to a transcribed copy of any notes made by a stenographer or to any reports or complaints made by investigators or other persons, except those which are deemed by the investigating agency to be confidential. No

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notes or reports that are deemed to be confidential may be entered in the officer's personnel file."

The California Supreme Court found that subdivision (g) of section 3303 was included in the Act to further the notions of fundamental fairness for police officers. (*Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. City of Pasadena* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 564, 573). The Court further found that to harmonize subdivision (g) as a whole, then the provision should be interpreted as requiring that, as is the case with recordings and notes, reports and complaints be produced after first interrogation and that the Legislature must have intended the discovery rights in each instance to be coextensive. (*Pasadena Police officers Assn.*, supra, at 576; See also *Gilbert v. City of Sunnyvale* (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1264; *San Diego Police Officers Assn. v. City of San Diego* (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 779).

Finally, the Act provides that if a public safety officer is interrogated in violation of these procedural guarantees, the trial court has the duty to "render appropriate injunctive or other extraordinary relief to remedy the violation" (§ 3309.5, subd. (d)(1)) including prohibiting any disciplinary action being taken against an officer (See Gov't Code §3309.5; Breslin v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1064; Alameida v. State Personnel Bd. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 46; Jackson v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 111 Cal. App. 4th 899) or the suppression of the officer's statements (see Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles (1985) 40 Cal.3d 822, 829; Hanna v. City of Los Angeles, (1989) 212 Cal. App. 3d 363; City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1512-1516) and the fruits of said statements. (See Perez v. City of Los Angeles (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 118 (Evidence that police officer had conducted an inappropriate training exercise by returning a knife to an arrestee's pocket was solely based on officer's statements during interrogation and thus was inadmissible in disciplinary proceeding as the fruit of the poisonous tree); Mounger v. Gates (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1248 (injunctive relief for violations of requirements for interrogations during investigation on basis that interrogations constituted substantial

violations of his rights under Gov.Code § 3303 and that he should be granted injunctive relief to prevent department from using fruits of violations and from committing future violations)

In the matter at hand, Doe Officer 2 was interviewed on June 18, 2015, and further interrogated on July 17, 2015. Doe Officer 1 was interrogated on June 21, 2015, and further interrogated on July 17, 2015. While they were not entitled to pre-interrogation discovery prior to the June interviews, they were entitled to the production of certain documents prior to their second or "subsequent" interrogations⁷. The City's failure to produce copies of all transcribed copy of any notes made by a stenographer or to any reports or complaints made by investigators or other persons prior to the second interrogation renders the second interrogation unlawful.

As Defendants will concede that they did not provide the officers any information or materials other than a recording of their first interview, they have violated the act and have done so knowingly.

C. Irreparable Harm

Not only is injunctive relief mandated by the statutes,8 but immediate and

⁷Defendants may argue that Plaintiff is only entitled to such records after the investigation has been completed and punitive action is being proposed. This is simply not true. As the Supreme Court observed in *Pasadena*, "[s]ubdivision (f) [now (g)] defines only disclosure requirements incident to an investigation; it does not address an officer's entitlement to discovery in the event he or she is administratively charged with misconduct." (*Pasadena*, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 575; *Gilbert v. City of Sunnyvale*, (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1283. Additionally, such an argument would make the provision "if any further proceedings are contemplated" unnecessary.

⁸ By prohibiting the proscribed activity and specifically authorizing enforcement by injunction, the Legislature had expressed its intent to prevent the public harm it impliedly determined this conduct would cause. In this case, Penal Code §637.2 authorizes injunctive relief, and Government Code §3309.5 specifically mandates that the Court render appropriate injunctive or other extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer. Accordingly, the where a legislative body has specifically provided injunctive relief for a violation of a statute or ordinance, a showing by a Plaintiff that he/she is likely to prevail on the merits should give rise to a

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presumption of public harm.

irreparable injury will result to Plaintiffs' as their rights will have been violated without remedy and to the detriment of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs will have their right to privacy violated by a third party and then be subjected to administrative investigation based on the contents of the illegal recordings (as edited by the Recording Party). Additionally, if Defendants are allowed to continue forward with their effort to appease anti-police factions, Plaintiffs have been informed that they can be subject them to disciplinary action which could range all the way up to and including termination. (See Government Code §3303).

Irreparable harm includes harm arising from wrongs of a "continuing character" and harms in which monetary compensation would not afford adequate relief or would be extremely difficult to ascertain. (See *People ex rel. Gow v. Mitchell Brothers' Santa Ana Theater*, 118 Cal.App.3d 863, 870-871; *Wind v. Herbert*, 186 Cal.App.2d 276, 285 (1960).

Any punitive action that involves suspension or separation involves removal from the Department's payroll with the possibility of all wages and benefits being terminated. terminated. As the Supreme Court stated over 50 years ago, the economic position of the average worker and, in particular, his dependence on wages for the necessities of life for himself and his family is essential to the public's welfare. (See *Ex Parte Trombely*, (1948) 31 Cal.2d 801, 809-10). While the Defendants may claim this is just an economic issue, it is not.

Losing a job, and the income it entails, amounts to irreparable harm. (*White v. Davis, supra*, 30 Cal.4th at p. 559 [lost wages and other benefits during lawsuit over budget impasse constituted serious hardship to those affected by impasse]; *Costa Mesa City Employees' Assn., supra* 209 Cal.App.4th at 308). In the matter at hand, the evidence will show that the employees were threaten with the possibility of loss of employment depending on the results of the administrative investigation. Importantly, a

 plaintiff is "not required to wait until he/she has suffered actual harm before he/she applies for an injunction, but may seek injunctive relief against the threatened infringement of their rights." (*Maria P. v. Riles* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1292; *City of Torrance v. Transitional Living Centers for Los Angeles, Inc.* (1982) 30 Cal.3d 516, 526).

Finally, even damage to reputation constitutes irreparable harm (*Regents of Univ. Of Cal. v. Am. Broad. Cos.*, 747 F.2d 511, 520 (9th Cir.1984) and injunctive relief is designed precisely to prevent "intangible injuries" such as physical harm, pain, suffering and injury to reputation. (*Arizona Dream Act Coal. v Brewer*, 757 F.3d 1053, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014)(because they lack adequate remedies, "intangible injuries" constitute irreparable harm); *Harris v. Bd. of Supervisors, Los Angeles County*, 366 F.3d 754, 766 (9th Cir. 2004)(physical harm including pain and suffering, constitute irreparable harm).

<u>D.</u> Balancing of Harm Favors Plaintiffs and Granting of Temporary <u>Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction</u>

In the instant case, the record establishes the reasonable likelihood that Plaintiffs will prevail on the merits and that if the Court does not issues an injunction to prevent further use of unlawfully obtained evidence Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm.

Defendants will be hard pressed to show any harm if the injunction were issued.

Indeed, if an injunction is issued, it will simply serve to maintain the status quo and if relief is denied in the future, they can move forward with their action at that time.

Where little harm would result to the city by delaying an investigation and/or disciplinary action, where denial of temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction restraining the disciplinary action pending trial would be tantamount to divesting the employee any remedy at all on his claims, where a TRO or preliminary injunction would serve to promote stable employer- employee relations and where the employee has a likelihood of prevailing at trial, it would be an abuse of discretion to deny an application

for a TRO or a preliminary injunction (See Heyenga v. City of San Diego (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 756). IV. CONCLUSION Based upon the foregoing Points and Authorities, Declarations, Verified Complaint and the file herein, it is respectfully requested that the court issue the requested Order to Show Cause and Temporary Restraining Order. COREY W. GLAVE, ATTORNEY AT LAW Dated: August 3, 2015 /s/ Corey W. Glave Ву_ Corey W. Glave, Attorney for Plaintiffs

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DECLARATION OF COREY W. GLAVE

I, COREY W. GLAVE, declare as follows:

1. I am an attorney at law licensed to practice before all courts of the State of California. My is located at 1042 2nd Street, Hermosa Beach, CA 90254, 90036, (310) 379-0065. If called to, I can competently testify to the following of my own person knowledge, except those matters stated on information and belief.

Ex Parte Notice

- 2. August 3, 2015, at approximately 4:59 p.m., I contacted Sr. Assistant City Attorney Laura Rossini, from the Santa Ana City Attorney's office. Ms. Rossini had previously informed me that she represents the Defendants in all types of these matters. The receptionist transferred me to Ms. Rossini's voice-mail and I left a message with the below information.
- 3. I informed Ms. Rossini that on August 5, 2015, at 1:30 p.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard, I would be applying, Ex Parte, for a Temporary Restraining Order on behalf of Plaintiffs Santa Ana Police Officers Association and Doe Officers (involved in the May 26, 2015, service of a narcotic search warrant on a location in the City of Santa Ana, commonly referred to as the "Sky High Medical Marijuana Dispensary"), in Department C-20 of the Orange County Superior Court, located at 700 Civic Center Drive-West, Santa Ana, California. I informed her that Plaintiffs will be seeking a Temporary Restraining Order to prevent and/or stay any further administrative disciplinary proceedings, and prohibit the use of unlawfully obtained evidence against the officers involved in the "pot shop raid." The application would also include a request for an Order to Show Cause re Preliminary Injunction, and that the basis for this requested relief was the provisions of Penal Code §632 and 637.2 (illegal recording of the officers), as well as the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act, and mainly the Act's document requirements under Government Code §3303.
 - 4. I informed Ms. Rossini that if the Police Department and/or City of Santa

Ana would stipulate to holding the punitive actions/proceedings in abeyance, I would stay the Ex Parte Application to see if the parties could resolve this matter without the need for litigation.

- 5. This same information was sent via electronic mail to the e-mail address that I know is Ms. Rossini's, and also to Chief Rojas, on that same day. A true and correct copy of said letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.
- 6. On the same date that this Application was filed with the Court, I sent, via e-mail, copies of the Summons, Complaint, and Ex Parte pleadings to Ms. Rossini.
- 7. I asked Ms. Rossini to inform me if they were going to appear and/or oppose this application. At the time of this filing no formal response has been received, but it is anticipated that the City will oppose the application.

Doe Officer Identification

- 8. I am personally aware of the identities of the Doe Officers referenced in this action. I have confirmed and verified that each officer signed his/her declaration. I have copies of the signature page signed by the Officers and have present such to counsel for Defendants. If the Court requires the actually signature with the officers names, it is requested that they be filed under seal.
- 9. The true identity of each officer is being withheld pursuant to Penal Code §§832.5-832.8, Evidence Code §§1043-1046, and due to several threats received as a result of the underlying incident. (See *Long Beach Police Officers Association v. City of Long Beach* (2014) 59 Cal.4th 59, 75). I have been provided a copy of the City of Santa Ana's response to a Request for Public Records, wherein the City indicated that it would not release my name due to the above considerations. A true and correct copy of said letter is attached as Exhibit 1.

Illegal Recordings

10. I am aware that on or about May 26, 2015, members of the Santa Ana Police Department, including the Doe Officers, participated in the service of a narcotic search warrant on a location in the City of Santa Ana, commonly referred to as the "Sky

High Medical Marijuana Dispensary" ("Dispensary"). During the search warrant service, a number of other uniformed officer and undercover officers participated in the search. The undercover officers, due to the nature of their continuing investigative work, wore masks to hide their identity from the general public.

- 11. I am informed that after making entry into the Dispensary all civilians present in the Dispensary were escorted out of the business and detained outside by police personnel. The only people to remain inside the Dispensary were Police Department employees, until Fire Authority personnel arrived to open locked safes. After all civilians were escorted/detained outside, as there were instructed to do by the supervisor on scene, the officers disabled all known recording devices (video cameras and DVR). With all civilians removed and the recorders no longer working, I believed that all police personnel present had a reasonable expectation that their conversations and actions were no longer being recorded. In fact, I am informed that the undercover officers present, evidently believing that they were safe to do so, removed their masks.
- 12. I later learned that, unbeknownst to the involved officers, the owners of the business and/or their attorney (collectively "Recording Party"), in anticipation that the Dispensary would be raided, placed additional hidden cameras in the Dispensary to record the communications (actions and words) of law enforcement officers. The Recording Party was not a party to the communications and did not seek nor obtain the officers' consent to have their communications recorded.
- 13. I am aware that the Recording Party then released edited portions of the secret and illegal recording to media outlets. It appears that the editing was done in a manner to purposely distort the other officers' actions and statements and to cause problems for both the involved officers and the City's enforcement actions.
- 14. I have not been provided copies of the actual recordings, but found edited copies on the website:
- http://voiceofoc.org/2015/06/santa-ana-to-investigate-police-conduct-in-pot-shop-raid/
 - 15. After the illegal recordings were released to the media, I understand that

representative of City of Santa Ana and Santa Ana Police Department viewed the videos and, based solely on the content of the edited and illegal recordings, initiated internal affairs investigations of each of the officers involved in the warrant service.

- 16. It is my understanding that without the illegal recordings, there would have been no reason to initiate an internal investigation of any officer as there would be no basis to allege any misconduct against the officers involved in the service of the search warrant.
- 17. On or about June 18, 2015, I appeared with and represented Doe Officer 2 at her interrogation as part of an administrative investigation, commonly referred to as an Internal Affairs investigation. Prior to being interviewed, Doe Officer 2 and I were shown selective portions of the illegal recordings. On behalf of my client, I objected to the investigation based on the fact that the investigation was initiated and based solely on the illegal recordings. Defendants did not deny that the basis of the investigation was the illegal recordings, but summarily dismissed the objection.
- 18. On or about June 21, 2015, I appeared with and represented Doe Officer 1 at his interrogation as part of the administrative investigation. Prior to being interviewed, Officer Doe 1 and I were shown selective portions of the illegal recordings. I again objected to the investigation based on the fact that the investigation was initiated and based solely on the illegal recordings. Defendants again did not deny that the basis of the investigation was the illegal recordings, but summarily dismissed the objection.
- 19. Both officers were informed that allegations had been made against them that they might have violated department orders, rules, regulations, policies, or procedures and further informed that a sustained finding on any allegation of misconduct could lead to discipline, up to and including termination. They were also informed, in my presence, that they were being ordered to continue with the interrogation and answer all questions or be subjected to discipline for insubordination, again up to and including termination.

- 20. I am informed and believe that at some unknown point, the City and/or Police Department obtained additional footage from the illegal recording referenced above. Based on the additional footage, I was notified that both Doe Officer 1 and Doe Officer 2 were being ordered to appear for further interrogation.
- 21. Upon being notified of further proceedings; to wit, further interrogations at a subsequent time, I requested that, pursuant to Government Code §3303(g), the officers, via my office, be provided, in a reasonable time prior to the further interrogation, all required documents under Government Code §3303. I further reasserted objections to the investigation in total as it was based on evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful recording of myself and other officers. The objections were ignored and the requests for documents were denied.
- 22. Both officers were ordered to appear for further interrogation without being provided any materials other than the recording of their first interrogation.
- 23. Doe Officer 1 was subsequently interrogated for a second time on July 17, 2015, at approximately 1015 hours. He was, in my presence, shown additional footage from the illegal recordings and interrogated about the content of the recordings. Doe Officer 2 was subsequently interrogated for a second time on July 17, 2015, at approximately 1112 hours. She was shown additional footage from the illegal recordings and interrogated about the content of the recordings.
- 24. I am familiar with the Internal Affairs investigative process at the Santa Ana Police Department, and have represented officers at that Department for over twenty (20) years. I am informed and believe that the Police Department, as part of the administrative (internal affairs) investigation into the service of the search warrant, were in possession and control of copies of the other reports and complaints (written by the investigators and/or others), including, but not limited to, copies of the illegal recordings, recorded interviews with other officers, and reports generated throughout the administrative investigation, including summaries of my first interrogation.
 - 25. I believe that the administrative investigation is nearly or actually

completed and that officers may be facing immediate and irreparable harm based on the Defendants' action. The City/Police Department is using evidence obtained in violation of the officers' right to privacy and without injunctive relief, there will no remedy for the violations of their rights. Any punitive action that involves suspension or separation involves removal from the Department's payroll with the possibility of all wages and benefits being terminated.

26. I am not aware of any additional administrative remedies the officers have and believe we have exhausted all administrative remedies available to the officers.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on August 3, 2015, at Hermosa Beach, California.

COREY W. GLAVE

DECLARATION OF DOE OFFICER 1

- I, DOE OFFICER 1, declare as follows:
- 1. I am an adult, over the age of 18 years of age and referenced in this matter as Doe Officer 1. I am a resident of the State of California and employed by the Santa Ana Police Department. My business address is 60 Civic Center Plaza Santa Ana, CA 92701. If called to, I can competently testify to the following of my own person knowledge, except those matters stated on information and belief.
- 2. I am a full time, sworn police officer for the City of Santa Ana, Santa Ana Police Department. I was one of the uniformed officer involved in the service of a narcotic search warrant on May 26, 2015, on a location in the City of Santa Ana.
- 3. I have been informed and believe that my true identity is being withheld pursuant to Penal Code §§832.5-832.8, Evidence Code §§1043-1046, and due to several threats received as a result of the underlying incident. (See *Long Beach Police Officers Association v. City of Long Beach* (2014) 59 Cal.4th 59, 75). I have been provided a copy of the City of Santa Ana's response to a Request for Public Records, wherein the City indicated that it would not release my name due to the above considerations. A true and correct copy of said letter is attached as Exhibit 1.
- 4. On or about May 26, 2015, members of the Santa Ana Police
 Department, including myself, participated in the service of a narcotic search warrant on a location in the City of Santa Ana, commonly referred to as the "Sky High Medical Marijuana Dispensary" ("Dispensary"). During the search warrant service, a number of other uniformed officer and undercover officers participated in the search. The undercover officers, due to the nature of their continuing investigative work, wore masks to hide their identity from the general public.
- 5. The Dispensary is designed such that when the public enters the establishment, they enter a lobby area, and then move into a separate sales/distribution area. The distribution area is not visible to the general public.

- 6. After making entry into the Dispensary all civilians present in the Dispensary were escorted out of the business and detained outside by police personnel. The only people to remain inside the Dispensary were Police Department employees, until Fire Authority personnel arrived to open locked safes. After all civilians were escorted/detained outside, I was instructed by my superior officer disabled all known recording devices (video cameras and DVR). I did this and believe that all recording devices were render inoperable. With all civilians removed and the recorders no longer working, I believed that all police personnel present had a reasonable expectation that their conversations and actions were no longer being recorded. In fact, the undercover officers present, evidently believing that they were safe to do so, removed their masks.
- 7. After this time, I had an objectively reasonable expectation that neither my or my partners' communications (words and actions) were being overheard or recorded and that my actions, conversations and all forms of communications would be confined to the parties thereto. My communications, at that time, were not in a public gathering or in any legislative, judicial, executive or administrative proceeding open to the public. I did not expect that my communications, or those of the other officers present, may be overheard or recorded.
- 8. I later learned that, unbeknownst to myself or the other involved officers, the owners of the business and/or their attorney (collectively "Recording Party"), in anticipation that the Dispensary would be raided, placed additional hidden cameras in the Dispensary to record the communications (actions and words) of law enforcement officers. The Recording Party was not a party to our communications and did not seek nor obtain my consent have our communications recorded.
- 9. I am aware that the Recording Party then released edited portions of the secret and illegal recording to media outlets in a manner to purposely distort mine and the other officers' actions and statements and to cause problems for both the involved officers and the City's enforcement actions.

- 10. After the illegal recordings were released to the media, I understand that representative of City of Santa Ana and Santa Ana Police Department viewed the videos and, based solely on the content of the edited and illegal recordings, initiated internal affairs investigations of each of the officers involved in the warrant service, including internal investigations of myself.
- 11. It is my understanding that without the illegal recordings, there would have been no reason to initiate an internal investigation of any officer, including myself, as there would be no basis to allege any misconduct against the officers involved in the service of the search warrant.
- 12. On or about June 21, 2015, I was interrogated as part of an administrative investigation, commonly referred to as an Internal Affairs investigation. Prior to being interviewed, I was shown selective portions of the illegal recordings. My attorney objected to the investigation based on the fact that the investigation was initiated and based solely on the illegal recordings. Defendants did not deny that the basis of the investigation was the illegal recordings, but summarily dismissed the objection.
- 13. I was informed that a sustained finding on any allegation of misconduct could lead to discipline, up to and including termination. I was also ordered to continue with the interrogation and answer all questions or be subjected to discipline for insubordination, again up to and including termination.
- 14. I am informed and believe that at some unknown point, the City and/or Police Department obtained additional footage from the illegal recording referenced above. Based on the additional footage, I was notified that I was being ordered to appear for further interrogation.
- 15. Upon being notified of further proceedings; to wit, further interrogations at a subsequent time, I, via counsel, requested that, pursuant to Government Code §3303(g), I be provided, in a reasonable time prior to the further interrogation, all required documents under Government Code §3303. I, via my counsel, further reasserted objections to the investigation in total as it was based on evidence obtained

as the result of an unlawful recording of myself and other officers.

- 16. My Penal Code §632 objections were ignored, and my request for materials was denied. I was ordered to appear for further interrogation without being provided any materials other than the recording of my first interrogation.
- 17. I was subsequently interrogated for a second time on July 17, 2015, at approximately 1015 hours. I was shown additional footage from the illegal recordings and interrogated about the content of the recordings.
- 18. Understanding the Internal Affairs investigative process, I am informed and believe that the Police Department, as part of the administrative (internal affairs) investigation into the service of the search warrant, were in possession and control of copies of the other reports and complaints (written by the investigators and/or others), including, but not limited to, copies of the illegal recordings, recorded interviews with other officers, and reports generated throughout the administrative investigation, including summaries of my first interrogation.
- 19. I believe that I am facing immediate and irreparable harm based on the Defendants' action. The City/Police Department is using evidence obtained in violation of my right to privacy and without injunctive relief, there will no remedy for the violations of my rights. I have been informed that I could be subjected to termination if the Department finds any violation of departmental policies based on the content and evidence from the illegal recordings. Any punitive action that involves suspension or separation involves removal from the Department's payroll with the possibility of all wages and benefits being terminated. My family and I depend on my wages for the necessities of life and any loss of wages and/or other benefits would constituted a serious hardship to me and my family.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on August 3, 2015, at Santa Ana, California.

Doe Officer 1

DECLARATION OF DOE OFFICER 2

- I, DOE OFFICER 2, declare as follows:
- 1. I am an adult, over the age of 18 years of age and referenced in this matter as Doe Officer 2. I am a resident of the State of California and employed by the Santa Ana Police Department. My business address is 60 Civic Center Plaza Santa Ana, CA 92701. If called to, I can competently testify to the following of my own person knowledge, except those matters stated on information and belief.
- 2. I am a female, full time, sworn police officer for the City of Santa Ana, Santa Ana Police Department. I was one of the uniformed officer involved in the service of a narcotic search warrant on May 26, 2015, on a location in the City of Santa Ana.
- 3. I have been informed and believe that my true identity is being withheld pursuant to Penal Code §§832.5-832.8, Evidence Code §§1043-1046, and due to several threats received as a result of the underlying incident. (See *Long Beach Police Officers Association v. City of Long Beach* (2014) 59 Cal.4th 59, 75). I have been provided a copy of the City of Santa Ana's response to a Request for Public Records, wherein the City indicated that it would not release my name due to the above considerations. A true and correct copy of said letter is attached as Exhibit 1.
- 4. On or about May 26, 2015, members of the Santa Ana Police
 Department, including myself, participated in the service of a narcotic search warrant on a location in the City of Santa Ana, commonly referred to as the "Sky High Medical Marijuana Dispensary" ("Dispensary"). During the search warrant service, a number of other uniformed officer and undercover officers participated in the search. The undercover officers, due to the nature of their continuing investigative work, wore masks to hide their identity from the general public.
- 5. The Dispensary is designed such that when the public enters the establishment, they enter a lobby area, and then move into a separate sales/distribution

- 6. After making entry into the Dispensary all civilians present in the Dispensary were escorted out of the business and detained outside by police personnel. The only people to remain inside the Dispensary were Police Department employees, until Fire Authority personnel arrived to open locked safes. After all civilians were escorted/detained outside, officers disabled all known recording devices (video cameras and DVR). With all civilians removed and the recorders no longer working, I believed that all police personnel present had a reasonable expectation that their conversations and actions were no longer being recorded. In fact, the undercover officers present, evidently believing that they were safe to do so, removed their masks.
- 7. After this time, I had an objectively reasonable expectation that neither my or my partners' communications (words and actions) were being overheard or recorded and that my actions, conversations and all forms of communications would be confined to the parties thereto. My communications, at that time, were not in a public gathering or in any legislative, judicial, executive or administrative proceeding open to the public. I did not expect that my communications, or those of the other officers present, were being overheard or recorded.
- 8. I later learned that, unbeknownst to myself or the other involved officers, the owners of the business and/or their attorney (collectively "Recording Party"), in anticipation that the Dispensary would be raided, placed additional hidden cameras in the Dispensary to record the communications (actions and words) of law enforcement officers. The Recording Party was not a party to our communications and did not seek nor obtain my consent have our communications recorded.
- 9. I am aware that the Recording Party then released edited portions of the secret and illegal recording to media outlets in a manner to purposely distort my and the other officers' actions and statements and to cause problems for both the involved officers and the City's enforcement actions.
 - 10. After the illegal recordings were released to the media, I understand that

representative of City of Santa Ana and Santa Ana Police Department viewed the videos and, based solely on the content of the edited and illegal recordings, initiated internal affairs investigations of each of the officers involved in the warrant service, including internal investigations of myself.


- 11. It is my understanding that without the illegal recordings, there would have been no reason to initiate an internal investigation of any officer, including myself, as there would be no basis to allege any misconduct against the officers involved in the service of the search warrant.
- 12. On or about June 18, 2015, I was interrogated as part of an administrative investigation, commonly referred to as an Internal Affairs investigation. Prior to being interviewed, I was shown selective portions of the illegal recordings. My attorney objected to the investigation based on the fact that the investigation was initiated and based solely on the illegal recordings. Defendants did not deny that the basis of the investigation was the illegal recordings, but summarily dismissed the objection.
- 13. I was informed that a sustained finding on any allegation of misconduct could lead to discipline, up to and including termination. I was also ordered to continue with the interrogation and answer all questions or be subjected to discipline for insubordination, again up to and including termination.
- 14. I am informed and believe that at some unknown point, the City and/or Police Department obtained additional footage from the illegal recording referenced above. Based on the additional footage, I was notified that I was being ordered to appear for further interrogation.
- 15. Upon being notified of further proceedings; to wit, further interrogations at a subsequent time, I, via counsel, requested that, pursuant to Government Code §3303(g), I be provided, in a reasonable time prior to the further interrogation, all required documents under Government Code §3303. I, via my counsel, further reasserted objections to the investigation in total as it was based on evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful recording of myself and other officers.

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- 16. My Penal Code §632 objections were ignored, and my request for materials was denied. I was ordered to appear for further interrogation without being provided any materials other than the recording of my first interrogation.
- 17. I was subsequently interrogated for a second time on July 17, 2015, at approximately 1015 hours. I was shown additional footage from the illegal recordings and interrogated about the content of the recordings.
- 18. Understanding the Internal Affairs investigative process, I am informed and believe that the Police Department, as part of the administrative (internal affairs) investigation into the service of the search warrant, were in possession and control of copies of the other reports and complaints (written by the investigators and/or others), including, but not limited to, copies of the illegal recordings, recorded interviews with other officers, and reports generated throughout the administrative investigation, including summaries of my first interrogation.
- 19. I believe that I am facing immediate and irreparable harm based on the Defendants' action. The City/Police Department is using evidence obtained in violation of my right to privacy and without injunctive relief, there will no remedy for the violations of my rights. I have been informed that I could be subjected to termination if the Department finds any violation of departmental policies based on the content and evidence from the illegal recordings. Any punitive action that involves suspension or separation involves removal from the Department's payroll with the possibility of all wages and benefits being terminated. My family and I depend on my wages for the necessities of life and any loss of wages and/or other benefits would constituted a serious hardship to me and my family.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on July 29, 2015, at Santa Ana, California.



DECLARATION OF DOE OFFICER 3

I, DOE OFFICER 3, declare as follows:

- 1. I am an adult, over the age of 18 years of age and referenced in this matter as Doe Officer 3. I am a resident of the State of California and employed by the Santa Ana Police Department. My business address is 60 Civic Center Plaza Santa Ana, CA 92701. If called to, I can competently testify to the following of my own person knowledge, except those matters stated on information and belief.
- 2. I am a male, full time, sworn police officer for the City of Santa Ana, Santa Ana Police Department. I was one of the uniformed officer involved in the service of a narcotic search warrant on May 26, 2015, on a location in the City of Santa Ana. I stayed at the location until it was being boarded up and I believe I was the last male officer to leave the location of the search warrant service.
- 3. I have been informed and believe that my true identity is being withheld pursuant to Penal Code §§832.5-832.8, Evidence Code §§1043-1046, and due to several threats received as a result of the underlying incident. (See *Long Beach Police Officers Association v. City of Long Beach* (2014) 59 Cal.4th 59, 75). I have been provided a copy of the City of Santa Ana's response to a Request for Public Records, wherein the City indicated that it would not release my name due to the above considerations. A true and correct copy of said letter is attached as Exhibit 1.
- 4. On or about May 26, 2015, members of the Santa Ana Police
 Department, including myself, participated in the service of a narcotic search warrant on a location in the City of Santa Ana, commonly referred to as the "Sky High Medical Marijuana Dispensary" ("Dispensary"). During the search warrant service, a number of other uniformed officer and undercover officers participated in the search. The undercover officers, due to the nature of their continuing investigative work, wore masks to hide their identity from the general public.
 - 5. The Dispensary is designed such that when the public enters the

establishment, they enter a lobby area, and then move into a separate sales/distribution area. The distribution area is not visible to the general public.

- 6. After making entry into the Dispensary all civilians present in the Dispensary were escorted out of the business and detained outside by police personnel. The only people to remain inside the Dispensary were Police Department employees, until Fire Authority personnel arrived to open locked safes. After all civilians were escorted/detained outside, officers disabled all known recording devices (video cameras and DVR). With all civilians removed and the recorders no longer working, I believed that all police personnel present had a reasonable expectation that their conversations and actions were no longer being recorded. In fact, the undercover officers present, evidently believing that they were safe to do so, removed their masks.
- 7. After this time, I had an objectively reasonable expectation that neither my or my partners' communications (words and actions) were being overheard or recorded and that my actions, conversations and all forms of communications would be confined to the parties thereto. My communications, at that time, were not in a public gathering or in any legislative, judicial, executive or administrative proceeding open to the public. I did not expect that my communications, or those of the other officers present, were being overheard or recorded.
- 8. I later learned that, unbeknownst to me or the other involved officers, the owners of the business and/or their attorney (collectively "Recording Party"), in anticipation that the Dispensary would be raided, placed additional hidden cameras in the Dispensary to record the communications (actions and words) of law enforcement officers. The Recording Party was not a party to our communications and did not seek nor obtain my consent have our communications recorded.
- 9. I am aware that the Recording Party then released edited portions of the secret and illegal recording to media outlets in a manner to purposely distort my and the other officers' actions and statements and to cause problems for both the involved officers and the City's enforcement actions.

- 10. After the illegal recordings were released to the media, I understand that representative of City of Santa Ana and Santa Ana Police Department viewed the videos and, based solely on the content of the edited and illegal recordings, initiated internal affairs investigations of each of the officers involved in the warrant service, including internal investigations of myself.
- 11. It is my understanding that without the illegal recordings, there would have been no reason to initiate an internal investigation of any officer, including myself, as there would be no basis to allege any misconduct against the officers involved in the service of the search warrant.
- 12. On or about June 18, 2015, I was interrogated as part of an administrative investigation, commonly referred to as an Internal Affairs investigation. Prior to being interviewed, I was shown selective portions of the illegal recordings. My attorney objected to the investigation based on the fact that the investigation was initiated and based solely on the illegal recordings. Defendants did not deny that the basis of the investigation was the illegal recordings, but summarily dismissed the objection.
- 13. I was informed that a sustained finding on any allegation of misconduct could lead to discipline, up to and including termination. I was also ordered to continue with the interrogation and answer all questions or be subjected to discipline for insubordination, again up to and including termination.
- 14. I believe that I am facing immediate and irreparable harm based on the Defendants' action. The City/Police Department is using evidence obtained in violation of my right to privacy and without injunctive relief, there will no remedy for the violations of my rights. I have been informed that I could be subjected to termination if the Department finds any violation of departmental policies based on the content and evidence from the illegal recordings. Any punitive action that involves suspension or separation involves removal from the Department's payroll with the possibility of all wages and benefits being terminated. My family and I depend on my wages for the necessities of life and any loss of wages and/or other benefits would constituted a

serious hardship to me and my family.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on July 29, 2015, at Santa Ana, California.

Doe Officer 3

MAYOR Miguel A. Pulido MAYOR PRO TEM Vincent F. Sarmiento COUNCILMEMBERS Angelica Amezcua P. David Benavides Michele Martinez Roman Reyna Sal Tinajero



CITY MANAGER David Cavazos **CITY ATTORNEY** Sonia R. Carvalho CLERK OF THE COUNCIL Maria D. Huizar

CITY OF SANTA ANA OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY

20 Civic Center Plaza, M-29 . P.O. Box 1988 Santa Ana, California 92702 (714) 647-5201 • Fax (714) 647-6515 www.santa-ana.org

June 22, 2015

SENT VIA U.S. MAIL

Mr. William Sherrill P. O. Box 5847 Statesville, NC 28687

Request for Information/Public Records Act Request of June 14, 2015

Dear Mr. Sherrill:

This letter is in response to your request for information of June 14, 2015 wherein you requested the names of officers that "raided the Sky High Medical Marijuana Dispensary," The names of the officers are being withheld at this time based upon significant officer safety concerns due to several threats received as a result of this incident. See, Long Peace Police Officers Association v. City of Long Beach (2014) 59 Cal.4th 59, 75. In addition, six of the officers involved in this incident were working in an undercover capacity and for that reason the names of the six officers working undercover will not be released.

The person responsible for withholding this information is the undersigned. This response is meant to completely comply with your request. Should you wish to discuss your request further, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Very truly yours,

SONIA R. CARVALHO City Attorney

Laura A. Rossini

Senior Assistant City Attorney

LAR:ab

SANTA ANA CITY COUNCIL

Subi:

Notice of Ex Parte Application

Date:

8/3/2015 4:56:50 P.M. Pacific Daylight Time

From:

Poaattorney@aol.com

To:

Irossini@santa-ana.org, crojas@santa-ana.org

CC:

poaattorney@aol.com

Ms. Rossini and Chief Rojas,

On August 5, 2015, at 1:30 p.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard, I will be applying, Ex Parte, for a Temporary Restraining Order on behalf of Plaintiffs Santa Ana Police Officers Association and the Doe Officers (involved in the May 26, 2015, service of a narcotic search warrant on a location in the City of Santa Ana, commonly referred to as the "Sky High Medical Marijuana Dispensary"), in Department C-20 of the Orange County Superior Court, located at 700 Civic Center Drive-West, Santa Ana, California.

The lawsuit regarding this matter was assigned to Judge Ronald Bauer, but he was not available and Judge Chaffe will be hearing the ex parte application. This is a non-appearance "hearing."

Plaintiffs will be seeking a Temporary Restraining Order to prevent and/or stay any further administrative disciplinary proceedings, and prohibit the use of unlawfully obtained evidence against the officers involved in the "pot shop raid." The application would also include a request for an Order to Show Cause re Preliminary Injunction, and that the basis for this requested relief was the provisions of Penal Code §632 and 637.2 (illegal recording of the officers), as well as the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act, and mainly the Act's document requirements under Government Code §3303.

If the Police Department and/or City of Santa Ana would stipulate to holding the punitive actions/proceedings in abeyance, I would stay the Ex Parte Application to see if the parties could resolve this matter without the need for litigation.

Please inform me if the City will be appearing and/or opposing this application.

Corey Glave Attorney at Law 1042 2nd Street Hermosa Beach, CA 90254

Cell: 323-547-0472 Fax: 310-379-0456

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Corey Glave, Attorney at Law, does not accept or consent to the service of process, motions, pleadings, documents or any other items by electronic format. Correspondence via electronic format does not indicate an agreement or consent to acceptance of service in such format.

Thank you and have a great day.