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5	Attorneys for [Proposed] Intervenor,		
6	SKY HIGH HOLISTIC		
7			
8	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA		
9	COUNTY OF ORANGE, CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER		
10		1	
11		No.: 30-2015-008	01604-CU-OE-CJC
12	SANTA ANA POLICE OFFICER	EX PARTE APP	LICATION FOR
13	ASSOCIATION and DOE OFFICER 1 and DOE OFFICER 2,	LEAVE TO FILE COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION; FOR LEAVE TO	
14	Plaintiffs,	FILE BRIEF IN	OPPOSITION TO
15			PPLICATION FOR CONTINUE T.R.O.
16	V.	HEARING PEN	DING FILING OF
17	CITY OF SANTA ANA, a Municipal Corporation; SANTA ANA POLICE		
18	DEPARTMENT, a public safety	Date: 8-6-2015	
19 20	department; CARLOS ROJAS, Chief of Police; DOES I-X, inclusive,	Time: 1:30) P.M.
20 21	Defendants.	. I	-
21	Derendants.	Unlimited Jurisdi	iction
22		Action filed: Trial date:	7-29-2015 Not set
24			
25	TO THE COURT AND THE PARTIES	5:	
26	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 387(a),		
27	proposed intervenor SKY HIGH HOLISTIC ("SHH"), a California non-profit mutual		
28			
	EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO F	LE COMPLAINT IN I	INTERVENTION - 1

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1 benefit corporation, hereby applies *ex parte* to the Court for leave to file a Complaint in 2 Intervention in the above-captioned proceeding, as follows:

INTRODUCTION AND BRIEF PROCEDURAL HISTORY I.

On May 26, 2015, officers from the Santa Ana Police Department, including 4 plaintiffs DOE OFFICER 1 and DOE OFFICER 2 (collectively, "Officer Plaintiffs"), executed an improperly obtained felony warrant on the property leased and operated by Intervenor as a medical marijuana collective in Santa Ana. After using a battering ram without knocking or announcing themselves, officers attempted to locate and destroy 8 9 video surveillance equipment including video cameras and recording devices. The officers were well-aware of the video surveillance system when they entered the facility 10 and knew they were being recorded by it. Indeed, Santa Ana's own recently enacted medical marijuana ordinance requires the use of security and surveillance systems by dispensaries. While they destroyed a number of cameras, officers failed to locate and 14 destroy several other cameras which thereafter captured their actions during the raid.

15 After being made aware of the video footage and alleged misconduct by police officers during the raid, the Santa Ana Police Department and its Chief of Police 16 17 repeatedly demanded that a complete copy of the recording be provided to them. 18 Accordingly, on or around July 5, 2015, the full video captured on May 26, 2015 was provided by Intervenor to an Internal Affairs officer of the Santa Ana Police Department. 19 20 On June 15, 2015, the City of Santa Ana, its police department and the Officer Plaintiffs in this case were sued by Intervenor along with several other co-plaintiffs in 21 federal court. (Matt Chou, et al. v. City of Santa Ana, et al., No. 15-CV-00941, filed June 22 15, 2015.) In the federal case, Intervenor and several of its patient members allege 23 officers violated rights protected by the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 24 25 federal Constitution. (A copy of the federal complaint is attached as Exhibit "A.") 26 On June 29, 2015, the plaintiffs in this case filed their complaint seeking to enjoin

27 defendants City of Santa Ana and the Santa Ana Police Department from using video

footage of the Officer Plaintiffs captured during the May 26, 2015 raid. (See Complaint, 1 filed on July 29, 2015 ("Complaint") at p.18,11.25-28 [seeking injunctive relief under § 2 3 632].) Subsequent to filing their complaint, the plaintiffs filed an *ex parte* application for a temporary restraining order and order to show cause re: preliminary injunction alleging, 4 5 inter alia, that the video recording captured by Intervenor constituted a criminal act under Cal. Penal Code § 632. (See Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining 6 Order filed on August 4, 2015 ("T.R.O. Application"), at p.2,ll.1-4 & 26-28, [alleging 7 criminal violation § 632 by 'Recording Party' earlier defined as Intervenor and 8 9 Intervenor's attorney]; See also Complaint at ¶ 18 & 19.) On August 4, 2015, this Court issued a tentative ruling stating it would likely issue a Temporary Restraining 10 11 Order based on the moving papers submitted by the plaintiffs. At the time the Court's tentative ruling was published, the Court's electronic filing system reported no opposition 12 13 had been submitted by the defendants.

14 As shown by the facts alleged below, Intervenor has an interest in the subject matter of the litigation given the plaintiffs aver both in their complaint and application for 15 T.R.O. that Intervenor's video recording was made illegally. Under the theory espoused 16 by plaintiffs, a finding by this Court that a violation of Penal Code § 632 took place 17 18 would subject Intervenor not only to potential criminal liability, but to pecuniary liability under Penal Code § 637.2(a). The City of Santa Ana and its police department are both 19 20 defendants in the aforementioned federal case filed by Intervenor and several of its patient members. As such, the interests of the City of Santa Ana are at odds with 21 Intervenor given it has no interest or obligation in protecting Intervenor from allegations 22 it violated section 632. Likewise, the interests of the Officer Plaintiffs in this case and a 23 determination section 632 was violated by this Court could impact the same issue 24 collaterally in the federal case barring Intervenor from litigating the issue in that court. 25 26 As set forth in the [Proposed] Complaint in Intervention (which is attached as

Exhibit "B" to this application), an order granting plaintiffs' application for a T.R.O.

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would be reversible error. Section 632 "excludes a communication made . . . in any . . . 1 circumstance in which the parties to the communication may reasonably expect that the 2 communication may be overheard or recorded" and while the officers may have desired 3 communications during the raid be kept confidential, the circumstances of the 4 5 communication were such that they had to expect they might be overheard or recorded. (People v. Nazary (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 727, 746-47 [Nazary].) Given Intervenor is 6 directly impacted by the allegation made against it by the plaintiffs, its application for 7 leave to intervene in this case should be granted. 8

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II. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT INTERVENOR LEAVE TO FILE ITS [PROPOSED] COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION AND LEAVE TO FILE AN OPPOSITION BRIEF TO PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR T.R.O.

Upon timely application, any person who has an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, may intervene in the action or proceeding. (Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 387(a).) Under C.C.P. § 387(a), a court may grant leave to non-parties to join the plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint; to unite with the defendant in resisting the plaintiff's claims; or to demand anything adverse to both parties. (Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 387(a).)

18 Courts have interpreted Section 387(a) to hold that intervention is proper where: (1) 19 the nonparty has a direct and immediate interest in the litigation; (2) intervention will not 20 enlarge the issues in the case; and (3) the reasons for intervention outweigh any 21 opposition by the existing parties. (See Truck Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court (1997) 60 22 Cal.App.4th 342, 346 ["Transco"] (citing Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil 23 Procedure Before Trial (Rutter, rev.# 1, 1996) § 2:414, p. 2–55, *emphasis omitted*); 24 Reliance Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 383, 386 ["Wells"]. An order 25 denying intervention is appealable. (See Mallick v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 26 434, 439.)

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A. <u>Intervenor has an adequate, direct and immediate interest in this</u> proceeding.

Courts grant leave to intervene when the intervening party has some potential stake in the outcome of the underlying case. (See *Fireman's Fund Ins. v. Gerlach* (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 299, 303-05, 128 Cal.Rptr. 396, 398-99.) Furthermore, the intervening party must stand to gain or lose by direct operation of the judgment, although it need not have a pecuniary interest in the dispute. (See *Simpson Redwood Co. v. State* (1987) 196 Cal.App. 3d 1192, 242 Cal.Rptr. 447.) However, the third party need not show that its interest will inevitably be affected by the litigation. Intervention will be allowed if there is a substantial probability of the effects of the litigation on the third party's interests. (*Timberidge Enters, Inc. v. Santa Rosa* (1978) 86 Cal. App. 3d 873, 150 Cal. Rptr. 606.) In this case, the plaintiffs allege a criminal violation of Penal Code § 632 by Intervenor and Intervenor's attorney in their complaint:

Unbeknownst to involved officers, the owners of the business and/or their attorney (collectively "Recording Party"), in anticipation that the Dispensary would be raided, placed additional hidden cameras in the Dispensary to record the communications (actions and words) of law enforcement officers. The Recording Party did not seek nor obtain the consent of any officer to record their communications. The Recording Party, which was not a party to the communications, in fact secretly recorded the private communications of the involved officers, including Doe Officer 1 and Doe Officer 2. The Recording Party then released edited portions of the secret and **illegal recording** to media outlets in a manner to distort the officers actions and cause problems for both the involved officers and the City's enforcement actions. (<u>Complaint</u> at pp.5-6,¶¶ 18-19.)

Penal Code section 637.2(a) provides:

Any person who has been injured by a violation of this chapter may bring an action against the person who committed the violation for the greater of the following amounts: (1) Five thousand dollars (\$5,000). (2) Three times the amount of actual damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff.

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It follows that Intervenor will be directly impacted by any decision rendered on the primary claim asserted by plaintiffs since such decision is persuasive for purposes of the currently filed and ongoing federal case, the ability to use the video evidence in the federal case is collaterally impacted by any section 632 determination by this court and a decision by this court finding a section 632 violation took place will operate *res judicata* against Intervenor in respect to any or all of the plaintiffs who seek relief under section 637.2(a). Likewise important are the allegations throughout the plaintiffs' complaint alleging illegal conduct by Intervenor. Any decision rendered adverse to the existing defendants in this case will have a negative impact on the Intervenor and its patient members seeking recompense in state claims filed against the City and the Plaintiff Officers as well as the federal case which is subject to California law for purposes of the video evidence at issue there as well as in this case.

B. <u>Intervenor's interests are not and will not be adequately represented</u> by existing party litigants.

Where the proposed third-party's interests are being adequately represented by an existing litigant, intervention is not appropriate. (Code Civ. Proc. §387(b).) However, the court has "broad discretion in determining whether to permit intervention," especially when there is evidence showing that the interests in defending claims would not necessarily be adequately represented by the named defendants. See *U.S. Ecology, Inc. v. State of Calif.* (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 113, 139-140; *People v. Superior Court* (*Good*) (1976) 17 Cal.3d 732, 737; *Jade K. v. Viguri* (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1459, 1468; and *Simpson Redwood, supra*. Here, the defendants are both adverse parties to the proposed Intervenor in an already filed federal civil case and in a pending Government Claim Act notice. While the plaintiffs erroneously aver the City and Police Department have violated Penal Code §632, the factual allegations from the complaint and T.R.O. application claim the violative actions were taken by Intervenor. Moreover, at the time

EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION - 6

the trial court announced it tentative decision to grant a T.R.O. in favor of the plaintiffs, no opposition appeared filed on the Court's electronic filing system.

3 The Police Department has had a long-standing relationship with the Police Officer Association plaintiff in this case as well. While a finding against the City and police 4 5 department in this case might result in some pecuniary liability for the existing defendants, the benefit for those same defendants in the federal case is markedly greater. Indeed, a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs here benefits people who have a longstanding relationship with the city, its police department and other people working within 8 9 the city. It follows that the interests of the existing defendants in defending the assertions made in this case are at issue. Also, liability under the remedy provisions of section 10 637.2(a) falls to the recording party – not to the named defendants in this case. Accordingly, the interests of the existing defendants and their noted lack of opposition and response make clear that intervention is proper in this case.

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С. Intervention will not enlarge the issues in this case.

15 Intervention will not in any way enlarge the issues in this case. Intervenor does not seek to expand or complicate the issues. Instead, it seeks to participate in the proceeding 16 17 for the sole purpose of ensuring that the issue that has a direct impact on it (*i.e.* whether it 18 violated section 632) is properly litigated and represented. Indeed, with the hearing on 19 the requested application for T.R.O. scheduled for the day this application is being filed, 20 there is little or no time for Intervenor to do anything other than appear and argue against any pre-trial finding a violation of that section took place. It follows that Intervenors request for a very short continuance of the *ex parte* T.R.O. hearing be granted and that it 22 be given a very short period of time to file a brief in opposition. 23

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D. <u>Given the court's announced tentative decision in this case and the lack</u> of filed opposition as of the publication of that tentative ruling, leave to intervene is necessary in this case.

Just hours ago, this court announced a tentative decision to grant the T.R.O. requested by the plaintiffs. In their brief in support of injunctive relief, the plaintiffs' argument supporting relief under section 632 is limited to two (2) paragraphs found on page 12, lines 9-17:

Plaintiffs will prevail in establishing that the recording of their conversations was illegal. First, all civilian personnel were removed and detained outside; the only people that remained were public safety officials. Next, all know[n] security cameras were disabled and the DVR was confiscated. The officers then began to act and speak freely while going about their duties. In fact, undercover officers felt safe enough to remove their masks— which the illegal recordings then videotaped their faces. The illegal recordings were recorded through a second set of hidden cameras that the officers were not aware of. Finally, none of the officers believed that they were being overheard or recorded, they did not consent to being recorded and they would not have acted or spoken in the same manner if they had know[n] that they were being recorded.

16 A decision to grant relief in favor of the plaintiffs without opportunity for the Intervenor 17 to oppose and argue against such an order will result in an order based solely on the 18 conclusory argument included in less than a page of the plaintiffs' moving papers. Indeed, the plaintiffs failed to cite Nazari, supra, where an employee of a gas station was 19 20 aware the station had video surveillance deployed and in similar circumstances attempted 21 to invoke section 632. At one point, suspecting additional cameras had been deployed, 22 he covered over ceiling areas preventing the cameras from recording him ("Nazary 23 further was aware that cameras had been installed in the ceiling of the manager's office 24 during his absence, plastering over them as soon as he knew of their existence." Id. at 25 p.747).. Those cameras were later replaced by the owners of the gas station when Nazari 26 was not present. He was later charged criminally after the recordings caught him 27 embezzling money, using drugs and engaged in a confrontation with owners and

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1 managers of the facility. Although he did not seek to exclude video evidence of the 2 embezzlement, he did assert section 632 to exclude parts of the video recorded in the 3 private office area and near PIC machines where he was unaware cameras had been placed. These recordings showed his drug activities as well as the confrontation with 4 owners. Referring to the part of section 632 that excludes applicability "in any ... 5 circumstance in which the parties to the communication may reasonably expect that the 6 communication may be overheard or recorded" (Id. at p.746), the Fourth District Court of 7 Appeal held Nazari had to have reasonably expected his communications would be 8 9 overheard or recorded. The court also noted, "Nazary was aware of K.A.'s continuing 10 interest in assuring the safety and security of their property, which had led it to install video surveillance equipment." Despite Nazary's covering over of cameras with plaster 11 in an attempt to hide his nefarious activities, the court concluded that, "[u]nder these 12 13 circumstances, it was not objectively reasonable for Nazary to expect the communications during the confrontation regarding his embezzlement of cash from the 14 15 station's PIC machines to be confidential and not overheard or recorded." (Id. at p.747.)

16 Here, the officers were well-aware of the existence of video surveillance equipment. Officers should have been aware of the provisions in both the proposed Santa Ana ballot 17 measures and the measure adopted by voters requiring surveillance and security systems 18 in collectives. Similar to the defendant in *Nazari*, knowing there would be surveillance 19 20 systems in-place, the officers attempted to destroy or disable those systems. However, it was never objectively reasonable for them to expect their communications would not be 21 recorded. Like in *Nazari*, the destruction and disabling of video cameras supports the 22 conclusion that the officers had reason to know there was a surveillance system in-place 23 that could very well include cameras they missed. It follows it was not *objectively* 24 reasonable for any of them to assume their conversations would be private in a highly 25 26 secured medical marijuana collective.

The unfounded and hearsay allegations included by the plaintiffs that secondary

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1 cameras were deployed by Intervenor solely in anticipation of a raid by police are without 2 basis and improper. While the officer declarations set forth the plaintiffs' desire they not be subject to recording, as the court in Nazari noted, "although Nazary may have 3 desired any communications with the owners of K.A. and Casarez during the 4 confrontation be kept confidential, the circumstances of the communication were such 5 that Nazary could reasonably expect that they might be overheard or recorded." 6 The facts and circumstances here – that the officers knew of multiple cameras and 7 recording devices, attempted to destroy those devices, were aware of the very secure and 8 9 controlled environment of medical marijuana collectives through the City's own ordinance regulating them – are different than the desire of the officers and the actions 10 they took to try to eliminate surveillance. In any case, it was unreasonable for them to 11 assume there might not be cameras they missed. Unfounded allegations that the 12 13 Intervenor intended to record officers are not supported by any evidence submitted by the plaintiffs. In fact, surveillance is deployed to capture **any** crimes that might be 14 15 committed in order to protect the collective from those committing the crimes and the damage done by them. Here, the video surveillance worked directly to that end and the 16 officers' desires to not have been recorded are not the same as whether it was reasonable 17 18 under the circumstances to believe they might be recorded.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, Intervenors application to intervene, to be granted leave to file an opposition brief to plaintiffs' request for a T.R.O. and for a very short continuance of the *ex parte* hearing now scheduled for this afternoon should be GRANTED.

DATED: August 5, 2015

MATTHEW PAPPAS Attorney for [Proposed] Intervenor


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because this is the district in which all of the events giving rise to the Plaintiffs' claims
 occurred (28 U.S.C. § 1391[b]).

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PARTIES

2. Defendant CITY OF SANTA ANA ("CITY") is municipal government established under the laws of the State of California.

3. Defendant MIGUEL PULIDO ("PULIDO") is the mayor of CITY.

4. Defendant YVETTE AGUILAR ("AGUILAR") is an employee of CITY.

5. Plaintiffs MATT CHOU, BRADLEY IDELSHON, MARLA JAMES and DAVID JAMES are individuals each residing in Orange County, California.

6. Plaintiff SKY HIGH HOLISTIC is a non-profit entity operating pursuant to
Ca. Health & Safety Code § 11362.775 and Section IV of the 2008 Ca. Attorney General
Guidelines for the Security and Non-Diversion of Marijuana Grown for Medical
Purposes.

7. Plaintiff BRADLEY IDELSHON is a licensed California physician.

8. Plaintiffs do not know the true names and capacities of defendants sued as DOES 1 through 10 and when such information is ascertained shall amend this complaint to reflect such information.

9. Defendants sued as DOES 1 through 10 are each and together responsible
for the actions complained of herein.

COMMON FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

In 2013, a group of citizens obtained the necessary number of signatures to
qualify a City of Santa Ana ballot-initiative ("Measure CC") regulating medical
marijuana for the November 2014 general election.

11. In or around June, 2014, the Santa Ana City Council caused a competing
ballot-initiative ("Measure BB") regulating medical marijuana to be prepared by the
CITY's attorney.

In or around July 2014, the Santa Ana City Council voted in favor of putting
 the CITY prepared ballot-initiative before the voters in the November 2014 general
 election.

4 13. The CITY's ballot proposal -- Measure BB -- included provisions for a
5 marijuana permit lottery.

6 14. Prior to the November 2014 election, a person hired by the CITY to
7 support the Measure BB campaign solicited \$25,000.00 payments from various people
8 affiliated with existing medical marijuana collectives in or around the City of Santa Ana
9 and promised successful inclusion in the Lottery and assistance finding a collective
10 location if the \$25,000.00 was provided to support Measure BB.

15. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based upon such information and belief allege that PULIDO, several DOE defendants, existing marijuana entities in Santa Ana and other individuals affiliated with the CITY met, discussed and conspired to have Measure BB placed on the ballot to compete with the signature based, grass roots Measure CC and that such action was taken to ensure a pecuniary benefit inured to those entities, individuals and CITY officials.

17 16. In November 2014, both Measure BB and Measure CC garnered more than
18 fifty percent (50%) of the vote during the general election. Measure BB obtained a higher
19 percentage of approval votes.

17. Following the November 2014 general election, Measure BB became
effective in the CITY which thereafter began implementing it as a CITY ordinance. The
marijuana permit lottery provided for in Measure BB was scheduled for and conducted in
February 2015.

18. Between June 2014 and August 2014, at the same time the City Council had
been presented with proposed Measure BB, PULIDO and other city officials named as
DOE defendants were receiving benefits, including limousine services, expensive dinners
and shows, currency and gifts from individuals and entities seeking to establish control
over the Santa Ana marijuana market.

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1 19. Prior to the November 2014 general election, city officials, employees and
 family members of city officials involved in the decision-making process related to
 Measure BB had direct pecuniary interests or memberships in Santa Ana medical
 marijuana collectives.

20. Between August 2014 and June 2015, PULIDO received financial benefits from a medical marijuana collective in Santa Ana, intervened to warn that collective when CITY action was pending, was observed at the collective and intervened with police officials on behalf of the collective.

9 21. Prior to the February 2015 permit lottery, various Santa Ana medical
10 marijuana permit applicants submitted multiple lottery applications and paid multiple fees
11 in an effort to subvert the process and win permits in the CITY. These applicants
12 solicited individuals to serve in the stead of the applicant for purpose of the multiple
13 applications made. Several of these applicants won marijuana permits.

22. The medical marijuana collective affiliated with PULIDO in which he has a pecuniary or membership interest and from which he has received money successfully obtained a CITY medical marijuana permit through the lottery process.

Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based upon such information and 17 23. belief allege that following the lottery, PULIDO, successful permit applicants, Santa Ana 18 police officials, other city officials and city employees met at various times and places, 19 individually and through attorneys or representatives, and agreed to create an 20 Enforcement Program the purpose of which was to close existing Santa Ana medical 21 marijuana patient collectives that had operated for months or years in the CITY thereby 22 eliminating competition for the successful permit applicants and collectives in which city 23 officials and employees have pecuniary or membership interests. 24

25 24. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based upon such information and
26 belief allege that the Enforcement Program incorporated strong-arm tactics designed to
27 result in permanent removal of competing medical marijuana collectives already operating
28 in the CITY that were not successful in the permit lottery. Such strong-arm tactics

COMPLAINT 4

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included, but were not limited to, termination of water and power to entire buildings
where medical marijuana collectives operated, removal of license plates from vehicles
used by police officers and city employees so as to prevent citizens from knowing who was
taking action against them, use of masks to prevent people from knowing that it was
police officers or city officials taking action and destructive police raids designed to cause
such massive damage to property so as to prevent collectives from operating further and
prevent them from mounting any legal challenge to the CITY's illegal actions.

In March 2015 and April 2015, officers from the Santa Ana Police 25. 8 Department, acting pursuant to the Enforcement Program, observed Plaintiff CHOU on 9 the sidewalk outside of a medical marijuana collective then being raided by police. 10 Plaintiff CHOU was not on the property of the collective and was not a member of the 11 collective. CHOU had no interest in or affiliation with the property subject to the 12 destructive police raid. CHOU was observing from the sidewalk and did not say anything 13 to or in any way interfere with officers. While observing, CHOU received a telephone call 14 and while on the call was, without warning, tackled by police officers who physically hurt 15 him, handcuffed him, took his phone and took him into custody. CHOU was thereafter 16 detained by police for at least five (5) hours. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and 17 18 based upon such information and belief allege that the actions taken by police officers against Plaintiff CHOU were done pursuant to the aforementioned Enforcement Program 19 and were specifically designed to exact punishment on Plaintiff CHOU without due 20 process of law. 21

22 26. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based upon such information and 23 belief allege that Defendant AGUILAR, knowing who Plaintiff CHOU was and 24 recognizing him as the owner of a completely different property where a previously 25 existing medical marijuana collective had leased space and operated but since closed 26 down, directed police officers to tackle and arrest Plaintiff CHOU.

27 27. In May 2015, while volunteering at Plaintiff SKY HIGH HOLISTIC
28 medical marijuana collective in Santa Ana, Plaintiffs MARLA JAMES and DAVID

JAMES, who are both patient members of that collective, were arrested and detained by 1 police officers as part of the aforementioned Enforcement Program during a raid 2 conducted by Defendant CITY through its police officers and city employees, including 3 Defendant AGUILAR. Police officers obtained a warrant not from a judge at the Santa 4 Ana courthouse, but rather from a judge at the Fullerton courthouse who had a prior 5 personal relationship with officers involved in the raid. Officers present at the raid knew 6 the raid was for violation of a municipal ordinance, a non-violent misdemeanor. Officers 7 participating in the raid had no basis to believe their lives would be in danger at any time 8 and knew that medical marijuana collectives are permitted under state law. Officers 9 further knew they had not ever been in a situation where they were endangered when 10 going to, dealing with or raiding medical marijuana collectives in Santa Ana. 11

12 28. During the raid of SKY HIGH HOLISTIC, officers were intentionally
13 destructive and destroyed video surveillance equipment, safes, furniture, fixtures, doors
14 and other property at the collective.

15 29. During the raid of SKY HIGH HOLISTIC, officers caused tens of
16 thousands of dollars of damage to the property and took thousands of dollars of currency
17 as well as marijuana medication.

18 30. During the raid of SKY HIGH HOLISTIC, officers consumed food
19 products that were the property of the collective.

31. During the raid of SKY HIGH HOLISTIC, officers made discriminatory
statements about Plaintiff MARLA JAMES, who is a disabled individual protected by
state and federal anti-discrimination laws.

32. During the raid of SKY HIGH HOLISTIC, volunteers and employees,
including Plaintiffs DAVID JAMES and MARLA JAMES, were detained for hours and
placed in fear by officers.

33. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based upon such information and
belief allege that the actions taken by police officers during the raid of Plaintiff SKY
HIGH HOLISTIC were done pursuant to the aforementioned Enforcement Program and

were specifically designed to exact punishment on Plaintiffs without due process of law to
 ensure that SKY HIGH HOLISTIC, a competitor of lottery-winning collectives and of
 collectives in which city officials have pecuniary or membership interests, was
 permanently closed and unable to seek legal redress.

34. The police actions taken during the raid of SKY HIGH HOLISTIC were excessive in light of the non-violent city ordinance violation police officers knew before and at the time of the raid was the reason and basis for the actions.

In May 2015, Defendant CITY, through its police officers, city employees 35. 8 and Defendant AGUILAR, without any advance notice or warning, caused power and 9 water services to be terminated at a building located at the intersection of French and 17th 10 streets in Santa Ana where Plaintiff IDELSHON, a licensed California doctor, leased 11 space. IDELSHON does not distribute or store marijuana nor does IDELSHON operate 12 a medical marijuana collective. As a result of the power and water termination, the toilet 13 in the restroom located next to Dr. Idelshon's suite in the building malfunctioned and 14 significant damage was done to his suite. As a further result of the power and water 15 termination, Dr. Idelshon could not provide services as a doctor in his suite, has been 16 forced to vacate the suite and has suffered significant damages. 17

36. Defendant CITY failed to implement and follow the provisions of Measure
BB when it took action ahead of the November 2014 election seeking \$25,000.00
contributions from medical marijuana collectives and individuals, when it implemented
the provisions of the law and when it conducted the marijuana permit lottery thus
depriving the Plaintiffs of due process rights protected by the state and federal
constitutions.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF DECLARATORY RELIEF (28 U.S.C. § 2201)

37. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege paragraphs 1-36 of this Complaint.

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38. An actual controversy exists between the Plaintiffs and Defendant CITY
 that requires the Court to determine whether the local ordinance at issue in this case,
 Santa Ana Measure BB, was implemented in a manner consistent with the due process
 provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution and whether the election
 conducted by the City for approval of Measure BB was conducted in a manner that
 violated the due process rights of the Plaintiffs.

39. The Defendants contend the CITY's implementation of Measure BB met
all constitutional due process requirements. The Defendants further contend the election
conducted in respect to Measure BB did not involve solicitation of money in exchange for
favorable treatment during the lottery process and therefore did not violate the due
process rights of the Plaintiffs.

40. Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration in respect to: 1) whether
implementation of Measure BB through the flawed lottery process violated their due
process rights thereby resulting in direct injury to them; and 2) whether, by soliciting
money in exchange for favorable treatment in the lottery process, Defendant CITY
violated the Plaintiffs' due process rights before and at the time Measure BB was enacted
by voters.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF PRELIMINARY AND PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS (28 U.S.C. § 2201)

41. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege paragraphs 1-40 of this Complaint.

42. The implementation of Measure BB through the flawed lottery process as
well as the planned Enforcement Actions put in-place by the CITY were done in a
manner that violated the procedural and substantive due process rights of the Plaintiffs
that are protected by the federal Constitution.

43. The conduct of city officials and employees in advance of the placement of
Measure BB on the ballot as well as prior to the November 2014 election in taking gifts

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1 and money as well as in soliciting \$25,000.00 payments by potential lottery applicants and individuals in exchange for favorable treatment violated federally protected procedural 2 and substantive due process rights of the Plaintiffs. 3

Continuing enforcement of Measure BB against the Plaintiffs violates their 44. 4 procedural and substantive due process rights under the federal constitution and an injunction prohibiting such enforcement must issue to protect those rights.

The Plaintiffs have a significant likelihood of prevailing on the merits in this 7 45. case. The Defendant CITY will not be harmed by an order preventing enforcement of 8 Measure BB. Accordingly, the balance of hardships weighs in favor of both preliminary 9 10 and permanent injunctive relief.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF **EXCESSIVE FORCE, DENIAL OF MEDICAL ATTENTION** AND SUMMARY PUNISHMENT WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege paragraphs 1-36 of this 46. Complaint.

During the raid of SKY HIGH HOLISTIC, the police officer DOE 47. 16 defendants each used excessive and unreasonable force when conducting the raid and arresting and detaining Plaintiffs DAVID and MARLA JAMES.

During the raid of SKY HIGH HOLISTIC, the police officer DOE 48. 19 defendants used excessive force against DAVID and MARLA JAMES thereby violating 20 the JAMES'S Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they had guns drawn on 21 them for a non-violent misdemeanor action, engaged in destructive behavior and when 22 they caused DAVID JAMES to suffer physical injuries when arresting and handcuffing 23 him. 24

During the raid of SKY HIGH HOLISTIC, the police officer DOE 49. 25 defendants deprived Plaintiff MARLA JAMES of medical attention and care despite her 26 complaints to them when they forced her to keep her hands above her head and notified 27

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them that she was in pain and in need of medical care thereby violating her Fourth and
 Fourteenth Amendment rights.

50. During the raid of SKY HIGH HOLISTIC, the police officer DOE
defendants used excessive and unreasonable force in light of the municipal code violation
they were there to enforce and deprived Plaintiffs MARLA and DAVID JAMES of their
Fourteenth Amendment rights by summarily punishing them through excessive
detainment and enforcement action without due process of law.

8 51. The unreasonable use of force by the police officer DOE defendants
9 deprived the Plaintiffs MARLA and DAVID JAMES of their right to be secure in their
10 persons against unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed to them under the
11 Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and as applied to state actors by
12 the Fourteenth Amendment.

The police officer DOE defendants knew that failure to provide timely 52. 13 medical treatment to Plaintiff MARLA JAMES could result in further significant injury or 14 unnecessary pain and suffering by her and their actions did in-fact result in deprivation of 15 her right to be secure in her person against unreasonable search and seizure and wanton 16 infliction of pain. The Defendants disregarded that serious medical need of MARLA 17 JAMES causing her harm and depriving her of medical care, as well as by using excessive 18 force on an individual detained and handcuffed and thus summarily punished her further 19 depriving her of due process of the law. 20

53. The conduct of the police officer DOE defendants was willful, wanton,
malicious, and done with reckless disregard for the rights and safety of Plaintiffs DAVID
and MARLA JAMES and therefore warrants the imposition of exemplary and punitive
damages.

54. The conduct of the police officers named as DOE defendants in respect to
damaging SKY HIGH HOLISTIC and its patient members for alleged violation of a nonviolent municipal misdemeanor was excessive and unreasonable and resulted in damages
in excess of \$100,000.00 to Plaintiff SKY HIGH HOLISTIC and was thus summary

punishment that violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 1 Constitution. 2

55. The conduct of the police officers named as DOE defendants in obtaining a 3 warrant from a state judge that one of the officers had a former personal relationship 4 involving drinking alcohol while driving in a vehicle was improper and violated the Fourth 5 Amendment rights of the Plaintiffs to be free from unreasonable and warrantless searches 6 and seizures thus depriving the Plaintiffs of rights protected by the Fourth and 7 Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution. 8

The conduct of police officers named as DOE defendants in tackling, 9 56. arresting and detaining Plaintiff CHOU with no probable cause, no basis to believe he was 10 engaged in any illegal conduct as well as without a warrant was excessive, unreasonable and illegal thus subjecting him to summary punishment without due process of law and 12 depriving him of his rights protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 13 United States Constitution. 14

The conduct of police officers named as DOE defendants and Defendant 15 57. AGUILAR in engaging in actions terminating the water and power services for the suite 16 leased by Plaintiff BRADLEY IDELSHON, were done without notice and opportunity by 17 18 a municipal government and without a warrant and thus violated the due process rights of Dr. Idelshon protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 19 The actions of the Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of their rights under the 58. 20 Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Accordingly, 21 Plaintiffs claim damages for the violation of these rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As a 22 direct and legal result of Defendants' acts and omissions, Plaintiffs have suffered bodily 23 injury, humiliation, fear, anxiety, torment, degradation, and emotional distress and should 24 be awarded damages as set forth below. 25

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FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR UNCONSTITUTIONAL CUSTOM OR POLICY

59. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege paragraphs 1-58 of this Complaint.

60. On and for some time prior to May, 2015, (and continuing to the present date) the Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of the rights and liberties secured to them by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, in that said Defendants and their supervising and managerial employees, agents, and representatives, acting with gross negligence and with reckless and deliberate indifference to the rights and liberties of the public in general, those of the Plaintiffs and those of persons in their class, situation and comparable position, knowingly maintained, enforced and applied an official recognized custom, policy, and practice of:

(A) employing and retaining as City police officer those police office DOEdefendants that had dangerous propensities for abusing their authority, mistreatingcitizens and engaging in use of excessive force;

(B) inadequately supervising, training, controlling, assigning, and disciplining
CITY police officers and other personnel, including the police officer DOE
defendants the CITY knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
known had the aforementioned propensities and character traits;
(C) failing to institute appropriate policies regarding constitutional procedures and

(C) failing to institute appropriate policies regarding constitutional procedures and practices for municipal code enforcement and alleged municipal code violations for CITY police officers including the police officer DOE defendants;

(D) failing to discipline police officers including the police officer DOE defendants for conduct, including of unlawful detention and excessive force;

(E) failing to properly investigate claims of unlawful detention and excessive forceby CITY police officers including claims for incidents CITY should reasonablyhave known involve officers with dangerous propensities for abusing their

COMPLAINT 12

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authority and for mistreating citizens by failing to follow written Police Department policies;

(F) maintaining grossly inadequate procedures for reporting, supervising,investigating, reviewing, disciplining and controlling the intentional misconduct bythe police officer DOE defendants;

(G) failing to adequately train officers, including the police officer DOE defendants;

(H) ratifying the intentional misconduct of the police officer DOE defendants;
(I) conspiring to give a false account to justify the excessive use of force; and
(J) having and maintaining an unconstitutional policy, custom, and practice of detaining and arresting individuals without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and using excessive force, which also is demonstrated by inadequate training regarding these subjects and these police officer DOE defendants.

61. The policies, customs, and practices of the police officer DOE defendants and CITY were done with a deliberate indifference to individuals' safety and rights and by reason of the aforementioned policies and practices of the police officer DOE defendants and CITY, Plaintiffs were injured, subjected to pain and suffering, denied medical care, summarily punished and denied due process of law.

The police officer DOE defendants and CITY, together with various other 62. 19 officials, whether named or unnamed, had either actual or constructive knowledge of the 20 deficient policies, practices and customs alleged in the paragraphs above. Despite having 21 knowledge as stated above these Defendants condoned, tolerated and through actions and 22 inactions thereby ratified such policies. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based 23 24 upon such information and belief allege that the Enforcement Program was created intentionally and in furtherance of an agreement that resulted in the deprivation of the 25 Plaintiffs' rights. The Defendants also acted with deliberate indifference to the 26 foreseeable effects and consequences of these policies with respect to the constitutional 27 rights of Plaintiffs and other individuals similarly situated. 28

> COMPLAINT 13

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63. By perpetrating, sanctioning, tolerating and ratifying the outrageous
 conduct and other wrongful acts, the police officer DOE defendants and CITY acted with
 an intentional, reckless, and callous disregard for Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The
 police officer DOES defendants' and Defendant AGUILAR's actions were willful,
 wanton, oppressive, malicious, fraudulent, and extremely offensive and unconscionable to
 any person of normal sensibilities.

64. The policies, practices, and customs implemented and maintained and still
tolerated by the CITY were affirmatively linked to Plaintiffs and were a significantly
influential force behind the injuries suffered by them.

10 65. Accordingly, the police officer DOE defendants, Defendant AGUILAR and
11 CITY are each separately and together liable to Plaintiffs for compensatory damages
12 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief as follows:

 For a declaration by the Court that continuing enforcement of Measure BB against these Plaintiffs violates the due process provisions of the United States Constitution;

For a preliminary injunction prohibiting Defendant CITY from enforcing 2. 19 Measure BB against these Plaintiffs and from engaging in unconstitutional conduct 20 against them that violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution; 21 For a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendant CITY from enforcing 3. 22 Measure BB against these Plaintiffs and from engaging in unconstitutional conduct 23 against them that violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution; 24 For compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at time of trial; 25 4. For general damages in an amount to be proven at time of trial; 5. 26 27 6. For an award of punitive damages against the police officer DOE Defendants and Defendant AGUILAR only; 28

> COMPLAINT 14

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- G. For judgment awarding Plaintiffs cost of suit;
- 8. For attorney's fees; and
- H. For such other and further relief the Court deems proper.

DATED: 6-15-2015

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